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BRIEF Clerk of Court 
Utah Supreme Court UTAH 
450 S. State DOCUMENT 
PO Box 140210 K F U 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0210 50 
.A10 
DOCKET HO.jm°&L 
RE: Jones v. Barlow, Case No. 20040932 
Notice of Recently Issued Supplemental Authority 
Dear Chief Justice and Associate Justices: 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(i), Appellee Keri Jones respectfully submits 
this supplemental authority recently issued by the West Virginia Supreme Court. The decision, 
In re CliffordK., — S.E.2d —, 2005 WL 1431514 (W.Va. 2005) (slip opinion enclosed as 
Exhibit A), was issued last Friday, June 17, 2005. 
In re Clifford K. addresses several issues similar to those raised by this case. In the West Virginia 
case, a lesbian couple had a child together using artificial insemination and raised the child 
together until the biological parent tragically was killed in a car accident. A trial court granted 
custody of the child to the surviving partner. The trial court's holding was reversed by an 
intermediate appellate court, on the ground that the partner lacked standing to seek custody. The 
West Virginia Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the trial court's order, holding that the 
partner had standing to seek custody as a "psychological parent" and that "the child's best 
interests would best be served by awarding permanent custody of [the child]" to her. In re 
Clifford K., slip op. at 46. 
Several aspects of the decision are relevant to this appeal. First, the common law doctrine of 
psychological parentage is very similar to lhat of in loco parentis. The key elements of the 
doctrine are: "the formation of a significant relationship between a child and an adult who may 
be, bui is not required to be, related to the child biologically or adoptively; a substantial temporal 
duration of the relationship; the adult's assumption of caietaking duties for and provision of 
emotional and financial support to the child: and. most importantly, the fostering and 
encouragement of, and consent to, such relationship by the child's legal parent or guardian." Id. 
at 36-37. Based on these criteria, a psychological parent ma> be "a biological, adoptne. or foster 
parent, or any other person" Id. at 36 (emphasis added). The person need not have a legal or 
biological relationship to the child or to the child's legal parent. Id. 
Second, a person may attain the status of a psychological parent "while living in the same 
household as the child and his/her legal parent or guardian." Id. 
Third, the purpose of the doctrine, like that of the in loco parentis doctrine, is to protect the 
bonded relationship between a child and a person who, while not a legal parent, functions as a 
permanent parental figure to a child. "The primary objective . . . is to serve the child's best 
interests, by facilitating . . . stability of the child . . . [and] . . . continuity of existing parent-child 
relationships." Id. at 42 (quoting W.Va. Code §§ 48-9-102(a)(l, 3)). Moreover, "a child has a 
right to continued association with individuals with whom he has formed a close emotional bond 
. . . provided that a determination is made that such continued contact is in the best interests of 
the child." Id. (citations omitted). 
Fourth, in appropriate circumstances, permitting a psychological parent to seek custody or 
visitation is consistent with respecting a legal parent's right to parental autonomy where "the 
child's biological parent not only acquiesced in, but actively fostered, the relationship that has 
developed" between the person and the child. Id. at 43. In addition, children also have a 
constitutionally protected right to maintain relationships with persons with whom they have 
established close parental bonds. Id. at 42. 
Fifth, the court noted that its holding is consistent with that of many other jurisdictions who have 
considered custody and visitation cases involving children born to same-sex couples. Id. at 38, n. 
20 (citing T.B. v.L.R.M., 2000 Pa. Super. 168, 753 A.2d 873; In re Parentage ofL.B., Ill Wash. 
App. 460, 89 P.3d 271); see also id. at 44, n. 23 (citing law review articles that describe other 
cases involving similar facts). 
Finally, due to the procedural posture of the case, the court relied on a statute addressing who 
may intervene in an existing custody proceeding; nonetheless, the court noted that based on its 
prior case law, a psychological parent clearly would have standing to initiate a custody action 
independent of any statute. Id. at 25, n. 9 (stating that the surviving partner "could have initiated 
an action to formally obtain custody of [the child] . . . because our prior case law entitles a third 
party to seek a change in custody from a child's natural parent"). 
This case is the most recent addition to the growing body of case law from other states holding 
that a person who is not a legal parent may be entitled to seek visitation or custody with a child 
where the person has functioned as a parent in every respect, with the support and 
encouragement of the child's legal parent, and has formed a bonded parent-child relationship, as 
discussed in more detail on pages 15-29 of Appellee's Opposition brief. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Lauren R. Barros JJOJJV? {-l^OM^-
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SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
1. Pursuant to W. Va. Code § 48-1-232 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004), a 
"legal parent" is "an individual defined as a parent, by law, on the basis of biological 
relationship, presumed biological relationship, legal adoption or other recognized 
grounds." The phrase "other recognized grounds" refers to those individuals or entities 
who have been formally accorded parental status or the functional equivalent thereof by 
way of statute or judicial decree. Such parental status is comparable to the rights and 
responsibilities of a biological or adoptive parent and includes, but is not limited to, the 
right to care, control, and custody of the minor child; the right to consent or object to the 
child's adoption by another person; and the duty to support the child. 
2. The reference to "exceptional cases" contained in W. Va. Code § 48-
9-103(b) (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) signifies unusual or extraordinary cases, and, 
accordingly, a court should exercise its discretion to permit intervention in such unusual 
or extraordinary cases only when intervention is likely to serve the best interests of the 
subject child(ren). 
3. A psychological parent is a person who, on a continuing day-to-day 
basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills a child's 
psychological and physical needs for a parent and provides for the child's emotional and 
i 
financial support. The psychological parent may be a biological, adoptive, or foster 
parent, or any other person. The resulting relationship between the psychological parent 
and the child must be of substantial, not temporary, duration and must have begun with 
the consent and encouragement of the child's legal parent or guardian. To the extent that 
this holding is inconsistent with our prior decision of In re Brandon I.E., 183 W. Va. 113, 
394 S.E.2d 515 (1990), that case is expressly modified. 
4. In exceptional cases and subject to the court's discretion, a 
psychological parent may intervene in a custody proceeding brought pursuant to W. Va. 
Code § 48-9-103 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) when such intervention is likely to serve the 
best interests of the child(ren) whose custody is under adjudication. 
u 
Davis, Justice: 
The appellant herein and petitioner below, Tina B.,1 appeals from an order 
entered December 2, 2003, by the Circuit Court of Clay County. By the terms of that 
order, the circuit court denied Tina B.'s petition for custody of the minor child, Z.B.S., 
who Tina B. had raised from infancy with her now-deceased partner, finding that Tina B. 
lacked standing to seek an award of custody under W. Va. Code § 48-9-103 (2001) (Repl. 
Vol. 2004). Additionally, the circuit court granted temporary custody of Z.B.S. to his 
maternal grandfather, the appellee herein and respondent below, Paul S. On appeal to this 
Court, Tina B. complains that the circuit court erred by finding that she lacked standing 
to assert her status as Z.B.S.'s psychological parent and to seek his custody in such 
capacity. Upon a review of the parties' arguments, the record presented for appellate 
consideration, and the pertinent authorities, we conclude that Tina B. is a proper party to 
seek custody of Z.B.S. Accordingly, we reverse the contrary decision of the Clay County 
Circuit Court. 
!In accordance with our practice in similar cases involving sensitive matters, 
we will refer to the parties by their last initials rather than by their full surnames. See, e.g., 
In re Stephen Tyler R., 213 W. Va. 725, 729 n.l, 584 S.E.2d 581, 585 n.l (2003); Tackett 
v.American Motorists Ins. Co., 213 W. Va. 524, 526 n.l, 584 S.E.2d 158, 160 n.l (2003); 
In re Emily, 208 W. Va. 325, 329 n.l, 540 S.E.2d 542, 546 n.l (2000). 
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I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The facts2 underlying the instant proceeding are not disputed by the parties. 
Tina B. and the decedent, Christina S., began living together on approximately November 
1, 1998. During the course of their relationship, Tina B. and Christina S. decided they 
would like to have a child together. Thereafter, Clifford K., petitioner below, was enlisted 
to help Christina S. conceive a child. Z.B.S., the biological child of Christina S. and 
Clifford K., was bom on December 25, 1999, and, following his birth, Z.B.S. resided 
continuously with Christina S. and Tina B. as their son. 
Tragically, Christina S. died as a result of injuries she sustained in a motor 
vehicle accident on June 1, 2002. On that same day, while Tina B. was still hospitalized 
as a result of injuries she had sustained in the aforementioned accident, Paul S., the father 
of Christina S. and the maternal grandfather of Z.B.S., assumed physical custody of the 
child. Afterwards, on June 10, 2002, Paul S. sought the office of and was appointed 
guardian of Z.B.S. by the Clay County Commission as a result of Christina S.'s death. 
Thereafter, Clifford K. and Tina B. jointly filed a petition for custody of Z.B.S. on July 
16, 2002; although Clifford K. was a party to the petition for custody, he apparently did 
2By order of this Court, entered September 16, 2004, the record in this case 
has been sealed upon the request of Tina B. Accordingly, only those facts that are 
essential to our consideration and determination of this matter wall be recited in this 
opinion. 
2 
so on Tina B.'s behalf and not because he sought custody of Z.B.S. for himself.3 
By Temporary Order entered September 23,2002, the Family Court of Clay 
County awarded equal visitation with Z.B.S. to both Tina B. and Clifford K., and granted 
Paul S. temporary custody of Z.B.S. Upon the conclusion of this hearing, a guardian ad 
litem for the minor child was appointed and extensive psychological evaluations of all 
parties were conducted. The guardian ad litem recommended that sole custody of Z.B.S. 
be awarded to Tina B. because she is his "second mother, by design and in actuality," with 
reasonable visitation by Clifford K., Paul. S., and Paul S.'s wife, who is Christina S.'s 
mother and Z.B.S.'s maternal grandmother. In light of the guardian ad litem's 
recommendations and the psychological evaluations, the family court, by Final Order 
entered July 25, 2003, found that "Tina B[.] has standing to seek custody of Z.B.S. as a 
'psychological parent' due to the significant caretaking services she provided prior to the 
death of Christin[a] S[.] and the strong parent-child bond that now exists between Tina 
B[.] and Z.B.S." The court then awarded primary custody of Z.B.S. to TinaB. based upon 
Tina B.'s status as the child's psychological parent and because such a placement served 
the child's best interests by promoting "[t]he stability of the child and the continuity of 
existing parent-child relationships." Shared custody by way of visitation rights, 
3In fact, Clifford K. not only acquiesces in an award of custody to Tina B.; 
he has not actively sought custody of his son and has chosen not to participate in the 
instant appeal. 
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denominated "custodial time," was awarded to both Clifford K. and Paul S. and his wife. 
Paul S. appealed the family court's adverse ruling to the Circuit Court of 
Clay County. By Order of Remand entered December 2, 2003, the circuit court adopted 
the family court's findings but determined, instead, that "[Tina] B[.] does not have 
standing to seek custody of the infant child" under W. Va. Code § 48-9-1034 because 
"[s]he is not the legal parent of Z.B.S., [and].. .the concept of'psychological parent' [has 
not been extended] to include the former same sex partner of a biological parent." Based 
upon this ruling, the circuit court transferred temporary custody of Z.B.S. to Paul S., and 
granted visitation to Tina B. The court further remanded the case to the family court for 
an award of the permanent custody of Z.B.S. to either Clifford K. or Paul S. 
Following the circuit court's order awarding temporary custody of Z.B.S. to 
Paul S., the family court, by order entered January 6, 2004, refused Tina B.'s motion to 
stay the circuit court's order and continued custody in Paul S. Thereafter, the family 
court, on remand, entered a Permanent Custody Order on March 2, 2004, recognizing the 
circuit court's ruling finding that Tina B. did not have standing to seek custody of Z.B.S.; 
awarding custody to Clifford K., as the natural father of Z.B.S.; and granting permanent 
4W. Va. Code § 48-9-103 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) establishes who may 
bring or participate in proceedings seeking to establish custody of a child. For the 
complete text of W. Va. Code § 48-9-103, see Section III, infra. 
4 
shared parenting time in the form of visitation to Paul S. and Tina B., with Tina's 
parenting time to coincide with Clifford K.'s parenting time. From that order, Paul S. 
appealed to the circuit court, which reversed the family court's ruling by Second Order of 
Remand entered May 3, 2004, concluding that "the family court did indirectly what the 
family court could not do directly which is to award petitioner, Tina B[.], custody of the 
infant child, Z.B.S." The circuit court then ordered that Paul S. receive temporary custody 
of Z.B.S.; awarded visitation to Tina B.; and again directed the family court to determine 
whether Clifford K. or Paul S. should be granted custody of Z.B.S. 
During the pendency of the family court remand proceedings and Paul S.'s 
ensuing appeal to the circuit court, Tina B. petitioned this Court for appeal from the Clay 
County Circuit Court's December 2, 2003, first Order of Remand which had directed the 
family court to determine who, as between Clifford K. and Paul S., should be granted 
permanent custody of Z.B.S. By order entered September 2,2004, this Court granted Tina 
B.'s petition for appeal; stayed the circuit court's December 2, 2003, and May 3, 2004, 
orders transferring custody to and maintaining custody in Paul S.; and reinstated the 
family court's July 25, 2003, Final Order awarding primary custody to Tina B. 
5 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The sole issue presented for resolution by the instant appeal is whether the 
circuit court properly interpreted W. Va. Code § 48-9-103 as precluding Tina B. from 
seeking custody of Z.B.S. When considering the correctness of decisions rendered by a 
circuit court that were based upon a family court's ruling, we apply a multifaceted review: 
In reviewing a final order entered by a circuit court 
judge upon a review of, or upon a refusal to review, a final 
order of a family court judge, we review the findings of fact 
made by the family court judge under the clearly erroneous 
standard, and the application of law to the facts under an abuse 
of discretion standard. We review questions of law de novo. 
Syl., Carrv. Hancock, 216 W. Va. 474, 607 S.E.2d 803 (2004). See also Syl. pt. 2, Lucas 
v. Lucas, 215 W. Va. 1,592 S.E.2d 646 (2003) ("In reviewing challenges to findings made 
by a family court judge that also were adopted by a circuit court, a three-pronged standard 
of review is applied. Under these circumstances, a final equitable distribution order is 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard; the underlying factual findings are 
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard; and questions of law and statutory 
interpretations are subject to a de novo review."). 
Of particular relevance to the case sub judice is our specific manner of 
reviewing the correctness of orders determining child custody: 
The exercise of discretion by a trial court in awarding 
custody of a minor child will not be disturbed on appeal unless 
6 
that discretion has been abused; however, where the trial 
court's ruling does not reflect a discretionary decision but is 
based upon an erroneous application of the law and is clearly 
wrong, the ruling will be reversed on appeal. 
Syl. pt 2, Funkhouserv. Funkhouser, 158 W. Va. 964, 216 S.E.2d 570 (1975), superseded 
by statute on other grounds as stated in David M. v. Margaret M, 182 W. Va. 57, 385 
S.E.2d 912 (1989). 
Lastly, we accord plenary review to matters involving statutory 
interpretation: "Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question 
of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review." 
Syl.pt 1, ChystalR.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W. Va. 138,459 S.E.2d415 (1995). Accord 
Syl. pt. 1, Appalachian Power Co. v. State TaxDep'tofWest Virginia, 195 W. Va. 573,466 
S.E.2d 424 (1995) ("Interpreting a statute or an administrative rule or regulation presents 
a purely legal question subject to de novo review."). Mindful of these standards, we 
proceed to consider the parties' arguments. 
III. 
DISCUSSION 
On appeal to this Court, Tina B. challenges the circuit court's decision 
concluding that she does not have standing to seek custody of the minor child, Z.B.S., who 
has resided with her since his birth and whom she has raised and cared for, with her now-
7 
deceased partner, since that time. In so ruling, the circuit court determined that Tina B. 
did not meet any of the criteria enumerated in W. Va. Code § 48-9-103 so as to entitle her 
to participate in Z.B.S.'s custody proceeding. Before this Court, Tina B. contends that, 
as the psychological parent of the minor child, she is entitled to participate in his custody 
proceeding and to seek an award of custody. By contrast, Paul S. contends that the circuit 
court properly denied Tina B. custody of Z.B.S. Z.B.S., appearing by and through his 
guardian ad litem, agrees with Tina B.'s contentions and suggests that his best interests 
would be served by awarding his custody to Tina B.5 
At issue in this proceeding is the solitary question of whether Tina B. is 
statutorily authorized to seek custody of Z.B.S. To determine this issue, it is necessary to 
examine not only the statute governing which parties are entitled to participate in custody 
proceedings, W. Va. Code § 48-9-103 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004),6 but also those canons of 
statutory construction which guide our analysis of this statutory language. The cardinal 
rule of statutory interpretation is to first identify the legislative intent expressed in the 
5We note the appearance of the various Amici Curiae in this case, Jeffrey L. 
Hall, Guardian ad Litem for Z.B.S.; Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.; 
National Center for Lesbian Rights; Lesbian and Gay Rights Project of the American Civil 
Liberties Union; and the American Civil Liberties Union of West Virginia Foundation, 
and our appreciation of their participation in this proceeding. 
6W. Va. Code § 48-9-103 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) identifies parties to an 
action allocating the custodial and decision-making responsibility of children. The full 
text of this statute will be discussed infra in the body of this opinion. 
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promulgation at issue. To this end, we have recognized that "[t]he primary object in 
construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature." Syl. 
pt. 1, Smith v. State Workmen ys Comp. Comm V, 159 W. Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975). 
We next scrutinize the specific language employed in the enactment. "A statutory 
provision which is clear and unambiguous and plainly expresses the legislative intent will 
not be interpreted by the courts but will be given foil force and effect." Syllabus point 2, 
State v. Epperty, 135 W. Va. 877, 65 S.E.2d488 (1951). AccordDeVane v. Kennedy, 205 
W. Va. 519, 529, 519 S.E.2d 622, 632 (1999) ("Where the language of a statutory 
provision is plain, its terms should be applied as written and not construed." (citations 
omitted)). 
Where, however, the statute's terms are less clear, statutory construction, 
rather than strict application, is appropriate. In such instances, "[jjudicial interpretation 
of a statute is warranted only if the statute is ambiguous and the initial step in such 
interpretative inquiry is to ascertain the legislative intent." Syl. pt. 1, Ohio County 
Comm'n v. Manchin, 171 W. Va. 552, 301 S.E.2d 183 (1983). Accord Syl. pt. 1, Farley 
v. Buckalew, 186 W. Va. 693, 414 S.E.2d 454 (1992) ("A statute that is ambiguous must 
be construed before it can be applied."). Furthermore, statutory construction is necessary 
to ascertain the meaning of undefined words and phrases. "In the absence of any 
definition of the intended meaning of words or terms used in a legislative enactment, they 
will, in the interpretation of the act, be given their common, ordinary and accepted 
9 
meaning in the connection in which they are used." Syl. pt. 1, Miners in Gen. Group v. 
Hix, 123 W. Va. 637, 17 S.E.2d 810 (1941), overruled on other grounds by Lee-Norse Co. 
v. Rutledge, 170 W. Va. 162, 291 S.E.2d 477 (1982). 
Applying the aforementioned analytical framework, we first consider the 
Legislature's intention in enacting W. Va. Code § 48-9-103. Companion statutes to this 
provision make it abundantly clear that the primary aim of this legislation is to secure 
custodial placements of children that serve their best interests and to promote stability and 
continuity with those parents or parental figures with whom such children have formed 
an emotional attachment bond. W. Va. Code § 48-9-101(b) (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) 
poignantly states that "[t]he Legislature finds and declares that it is the public policy of 
this state to assure that the best interest of children is the court's primary concern in 
allocating custodial and decision-making responsibilities between parents who do not live 
together." Similarly, W. Va. Code § 48-9-102 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) enumerates 
specific factors that are essential to promoting and safeguarding the best interests standard: 
(a) The primary objective of this article is to serve the 
child's best interests, by facilitating: 
(1) Stability of the child; 
(2) Parental planning and agreement about the child's 
custodial arrangements and upbringing; 
(3) Continuity of existing parent-child attachments; 
(4) Meaningful contact between a child and each 
10 
parent; 
(5) Caretaking relationships by adults who love the 
child, know how to provide for the child's needs, and who 
place a high priority on doing so; 
(6) Security from exposure to physical or emotional 
harm; and 
(7) Expeditious, predictable decision-making and 
avoidance of prolonged uncertainty respecting arrangements 
for the child's care and control. 
(b) A secondary objective of [this] article is to achieve 
fairness between the parents. 
These legislative statements of purpose also are consistent with this Court's 
pronouncements identifying the best interests of the child as being the paramount 
consideration by which custody determinations should be made. We repeatedly have held 
that c"[i]n a contest involving the custody of an infant the welfare of the child is the polar 
star by which the discretion of the court will be guided.' Point 2, Syllabus, State ex rel 
Lipscomb v.Joplin, 131 W. Va. 302[,47 S.E.2d221 (1948)]." Syl.pt. 19 State ex rel Cash 
v. Lively, 155 W. Va. 801, 187 S.E.2d 601 (1972). See also Syl. pt. 3, in part, In re Katie 
S.9 198 W. Va. 79,479 S.E.2d 589 (1996) ("Although parents have substantial rights that 
must be protected, the primary goal . . . in all family law matters . . . must be the health 
and welfare of the children."); Syl. pt. 5, Carter v. Carter, 196 W. Va. 239,470 S.E.2d 193 
(1996) ("In visitation as well as custody matters, we have traditionally held paramount the 
best interests of the child."); David M. v. Margaret M, 182 W. Va. 57, 60,385 S.E.2d 912, 
11 
916 (1989) (The "child's welfare is the paramount and controlling factor in all custody 
matters." (citations omitted)). Thus, "[t]o justify a change of child custody, in addition 
to a change in circumstances of the parties, it must be shown that such change would 
materially promote the welfare of the child." Syl. pt. 2, Cloud v. Cloud, 161 W. Va. 45, 
239 S.E.2d 669 (1977) (per curiam). 
To further promote this stated goal to safeguard the best interests of children, 
the Legislature has recognized that, in certain circumstances, persons who are not a child's 
parent or legal guardian might also be proper parties to a custody proceeding. In this 
regard, the statute at issue in this proceeding, W. Va. Code § 48-9-103 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 
2004), delineates who may participate in actions involving custodial determinations by 
identifying various categories of persons who have statutorily been granted permission to 
participate in custodial determination actions: 
(a) Persons who have a right to be notified of and 
participate as a party in an action filed by another are: 
(1) A legal parent of the child, as defined in section 1-
232 [§ 48-1-232] of this chapter; 
(2) An adult allocated custodial responsibility or 
decision-making responsibility under a parenting plan 
regarding the child that is then in effect; or 
(3) Persons who were parties to a prior order 
establishing custody and visitation, or who, under a parenting 
plan, were allocated custodial responsibility or decision-
making responsibility. 
12 
(b) In exceptional cases the court may, in its discretion, 
grant permission to intervene to other persons or public 
agencies whose participation in the proceedings under this 
article it determines is likely to serve the child's best interests. 
The court may place limitations on participation by the 
intervening party as the court determines to be appropriate. 
Such persons or public agencies do not have standing to 
initiate an action under this article. 
W. Va. Code § 48-9-103. Of the four enumerated classes, the parties agree that neither 
subsection (a)(2) nor subsection (a)(3) applies to the case sub judice insofar as no 
parenting plan or custodial and visitation order has previously been entered regarding 
Z.B.S. feW. Va. Code §§ 48-9-103(a)(2-3). See also W. Va. Code § 48-1-235.3 (2001) 
(Repl. Vol. 2004) (defining "parenting plan").7 
The parties disagree, however, as to which of the remaining subsections of 
W. Va. Code § 48-9-103 is applicable to the facts at issue herein and whether the pertinent 
7W. Va. Code § 48-1-235.3 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) defines a "[pjarenting 
plan" as "a temporary parenting plan as defined in subdivision (22) of this section or a 
permanent parenting plan as defined in subdivision (17) of this section." Though defined 
in an earlier version of the domestic relations statutes, "temporary parenting plan" is no 
longer statutorily defined. However, 
"[pjermanent parenting plan" means a plan for 
parenting a child that is incorporated into a final order or 
subsequent modification order in a domestic relations action. 
The plan principally establishes, but is not limited to, the 
allocation of custodial responsibility and significant decision-
making responsibility and provisions for resolution of 
subsequent disputes between the parents. 
W. Va. Code § 48-1-235.4 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004). 
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provision permits Tina B. to participate in Z.B.S. 's custody proceeding. Tina B. contends 
that she is Z.B.S.'s legal parent and thus is entitled to participate in the proceedings 
pursuant to W. Va. Code § 48-9-103(a)(l). By contrast, Paul S. asserts that the only 
provision that could conceivably grant Tina B. permission to participate in these 
proceedings is W. Va. Code § 48-9-103(b) and that, even under that subsection, Tina B. 
is not entitled to custody of Z.B.S. We will consider each of these arguments in turn. 
A. W. Va. Code § 48-9-103(a)(I) 
Tina B. contends that she is the legal parent of Z.B.S., and, thus, she is 
entitled to seek his custody pursuant to W. Va. Code § 48-9-103(a)(l). "Legal parent" is 
defined in W. Va. Code § 48-1-232 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) as "an individual defined as 
a parent, by law, on the basis of biological relationship, presumed biological relationship, 
legal adoption or other recognized grounds." From this definition, Tina B. does not 
qualify as Z.B.S.'s legal parent under the first two enumerated criteria because she has 
neither a biological nor a presumed biological relationship with him. Furthermore, Tina 
B. has not formally adopted Z.B.S. so she does not qualify as his legal parent on that basis. 
The final manner in which Tina B. may qualify as the legal parent of Z.B.S. is if she has 
been determined to be his parent on the basis of "other recognized grounds". W. Va. Code 
§ 48-1-232. Under the facts of the instant proceeding, however, we reject Tina B.'s 
argument that she meets this definition as such a construction is not contemplated by the 
expressed legislative intent. 
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In stating who may be a child's "legal parent," the Legislature has left 
undefined the qualification described as "other recognized grounds." See W. Va. Code 
§ 48-1-232. Absent precise legislative guidance, we must defer instead to the "common, 
ordinary and accepted meaning [of the terms] in the connection in which they are used." 
Syl. pt. 1, in part, Miners in Gen. Group v. Hix, 123 W. Va. 637, 17 S.E.2d 810. The 
customary construction of the word "recognized" is "[acknowledged, admitted; known." 
VIII The Oxford English Dictionary 253 (1970 re-issue). More specifically, to 
"recognize" is "to acknowledge formally." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 
984 (9th ed. 1983). Accord Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary 1611 (2d 
ed. 1998) (defining "recognize" as "to acknowledge or accept formally a specified factual 
or legal situation . . . to acknowledge or treat as valid"). See also Price v. United States, 
100 F. Supp. 310, 316 (Ct. CI. 1951) (construing word "recognize" as meaning "to 
acknowledge by admitting to a privileged status" (internal quotations and citation 
omitted)). Thus, it is apparent that the Legislature's reference to "other recognized 
grounds" in W. Va. Code § 48-1-232 contemplates a formal acknowledgment of parental 
status or the functional equivalent thereof. A brief survey of this State's statutory law 
regarding the care and custody of minor children provides several examples of the above-
referenced "other recognized grounds" wherein the Legislature has formally 
acknowledged parental status or has recognized its functional equivalent. 
For example, the Legislature has determined that, in paternity proceedings, 
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a man may automatically be declared to be a child's legal father in certain circumstances. 
Where there exists scientific certainty that a man is the subject child's biological father, 
he is denominated as such: "Undisputed blood or tissue test results which show a 
statistical probability of paternity of more than ninety-eight percent shall, when filed, 
legally establish the man as the father of the child for all purposes and child support may 
be established pursuant to the provisions of this chapter." W. Va. Code § 48-24-103(a)(3) 
(2002) (Repl. Vol. 2004) (emphasis added). Accord Syl. pt. 5, MildredL.M. v. John O.F., 
192 W. Va. 345, 452 S.E.2d 436 (1994) ("Under W. Va. Code, 48A-6-3 (1992), 
undisputed blood or tissue test results indicating a statistical probability of paternity or 
more than ninety-eight percent are conclusive on the issue of paternity, and the circuit 
court should enter judgment accordingly."). 
Likewise, a man who acknowledges that he is the subject child's father will 
be legally declared as such: "A written, notarized acknowledgment executed pursuant to 
the provisions of section twelve [§ 16-5-12], article five, chapter sixteen of this code 
legally establishes the man as the father of the child for all purposes and child support may 
be established in accordance with the support guidelines set forth in article 13-101, et seq. 
[§§ 48-13-101 et seq.]." W. Va. Code § 48-24-106 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) (emphasis 
added). See also Syl. pt. 2, State ex rel W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., Child 
Support Div. v. Cline, 197 W. Va. 79, 475 S.E.2d 79 (1996) ("Absent a judicial 
determination that an acknowledgment of paternity was entered into under fraud or duress, 
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a written notarized acknowledgment by both the man and woman that the man is the father 
of the named child legally and irrevocably establishes the man as the father of the child for 
all purposes including child support obligations." (emphasis added)). In either 
circumstance, the formal recognition of paternity accords the man unrestricted parental 
status as the child's legal father, accompanied by a duty to support the child and to repay 
past due child support obligations. See W. Va. Code § 48-24-104 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 
2004). 
Additionally, the Legislature has declared that, in adoption proceedings, the 
male parent of a child will be accorded "determined father" or "legal father" parental 
status depending upon the circumstances surrounding such a denomination. Based upon 
the nuances of a particular factual scenario, a man may be declared to be the subject 
child's "[determined father": 
"Determined father" means, before adoption, a person: 
(1) In whom paternity has been established pursuant to the 
provisions of article 24-101 etseq. [§§48-24-101 etseq.],and 
section 16-5-12, whether by adjudication or achiowledgment 
as set forth therein; or (2) who has been other-wise judicially 
determined to be the biological father of the child entitled to 
parental rights; or (3) who has asserted his paternity of the 
child in an action commenced pursuant to the provisions of 
article 24-101, et seq., that is pending at the time of the filing 
of the adoption petition. 
W. Va. Code § 48-22-109 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) (emphasis added). In other situations, 
the man may be denominated as the child's "[l]egal father": 
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"Legal father" means, before adoption, the male person 
having the legal relationship of parent to a child: (1) Who is 
married to its mother at the time of conception; or (2) who is 
married to its mother at the time of birth of the child; or (3) 
who is the biological father of the child and who marries the 
mother before an adoption of the child. 
W. Va. Code § 48-22-110 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) (emphasis added). Regardless of the 
appellation that is factually appropriate in a given case, the status of both a determined 
father and a legal father are accompanied by legal rights to the care and custody of the 
minor child such that the consent to adoption or relinquishment of parental rights of either 
a determined father or a legal father is required before his child may be adopted by another 
person. See W. Va. Code §§ 48-22-301(a)(l,4) (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) ("[C]onsent to 
or relinquishment for adoption of a minor child is required of: (1) The parents or surviving 
parent, whether adult or infant, of a marital child . . . and (4) The determined father."). 
Moreover, the Legislature has recognized the functional equivalent of 
parental status to exist in certain circumstances. For example, one who is appointed or 
nominated as a guardian upon the death of a minor child's parent(s) is formally accorded 
rights and responsibilities that are substantially the same as those that would have been 
enjoyed by the child's parent(s). See W. Va. Code § 44-10-1 (1923) (Repl. Vol. 2004) 
(describing "[tjestamentary guardians"); W. Va. Code § 44-10-3 (2004) (Repl. Vol. 2004) 
(concemingjudicial appointment of guardian); W. Va. Code § 44-10-4 (2004) (Repl. Vol. 
2004) (addressing ability of older child to nominate his/her guardian upon death of child's 
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parent(s)). Under such circumstances, the guardian essentially steps into the shoes of the 
deceased parent(s) to fulfill the parental role as a result of the inability of the parent(s) to 
do so. 
In this regard, a guardian appointed or nominated upon the death of a minor 
child's parent(s) "shall have the possession, care and management of his ward's estate, 
real and personal, and out of the proceeds of such estate shall provide for his maintenance 
and education; and shall have also, except as otherwise provided in this article, the custody 
of his ward." W. Va. Code § 44-10-7 (1996) (Repl. Vol. 2004). A guardian also 
possesses legal rights to the child such that the guardian's consent is required before the 
child may be adopted. See W. Va. Code § 48-22-301(d) (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) ("If all 
persons entitled to parental rights of the child sought to be adopted are deceased . . . then 
consent or relinquishment is required of the legal guardian or any other person having 
legal custody of the child at the time."). 
Similarly, the Legislature has accorded the West Virginia Department of 
Health and Human Resources the functional equivalent of parental status in cases 
involving the abuse, neglect, and/or abandonment of a child. In such cases, "[i]t shall be 
the responsibility of the state department to provide care for neglected children who are 
committed to its care for custody or guardianship." W. Va. Code § 49-2-1 (1998) (Repl. 
Vol. 2004). 
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A child committed to the state department for 
guardianship, after termination of parental rights, shall remain 
in the care of the department until he attains the age of 
eighteen years, or is married, or is adopted, or guardianship is 
relinquished through the court. 
A child committed to the state department for custody 
shall remain in the care of the department until he attains the 
age of eighteen years, or until he is discharged because he is 
no longer in need of care. 
W. Va. Code § 49-2-2 (1972) (Repl. Vol. 2004). Although a distinction has been made 
between children whose guardianship, as distinguished from custody, has been committed 
to the State, it is nevertheless apparent that, in both instances, the State steps into a 
parental-type role insofar as it retains ultimate responsibility for the health and welfare of 
the subject child. 
When a child's custody has been awarded to the State, the Legislature has 
additionally vested the State with sufficient legal rights to the child to require its consent 
to the child's adoption if the parental rights of the child's parents' are ultimately 
terminated or relinquished. Compare W. Va. Code § 49-3-l(a)(l) (2001) (Repl. Vol. 
2004) ("Whenever . . . the department of health and human resources has been given the 
permanent legal and physical custody of any child and the rights of the mother and the 
rights of the legal, determined, putative, outside or unknown father of the child have been 
terminated by order of a court of competent jurisdiction or by a legally executed 
relinquishment of parental rights,... the department may consent to the adoption of the 
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child pursuant to the provisions of article twenty-two [§ § 48-22-101 et seq.], chapter forty-
eight of this code.") with W. Va. Code § 48-22-301(d) (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) ("If all 
persons entitled to parental rights of the child sought to be adopted... have been deprived 
of the custody of the child by law, then consent or relinquishment is required of the legal 
guardian or any other person having legal custody of the child at the time."). 
"The Legislature, when it enacts legislation, is presumed to know its prior 
enactments.' Syllabus Point 12, Vest v. Cobb, 138 W. Va. 660, 76 S.E.2d 885 (1953)." 
Syl. pt. 5, Pullano v. City ofBluefield, 176 W. Va. 198, 342 S.E.2d 164 (1986). Based 
upon the foregoing analysis, it is evident that our construction of the phrase "other 
recognized grounds" is consistent with the Legislature's intent in employing that 
terminology when it defined "legal parent" in W. Va. Code § 48-1-232 and in keeping 
with the parameters of parental status, or comparable rights and responsibilities, that the 
Legislature has bestowed upon individuals in certain enumerated circumstances in order 
to safeguard the best interests of the children involved. Accordingly, we hold that, 
pursuant to W. Va. Code § 48-1-232 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004), a "legal parent" is "an 
individual defined as a parent, by law, on the basis of biological relationship, presumed 
biological relationship, legal adoption or other recognized grounds." The phrase "other 
recognized grounds" refers to those individuals or entities who have been formally 
accorded parental status or the functional equivalent thereof by way of statute or judicial 
decree. Such parental status is comparable to the rights and responsibilities of a biological 
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or adoptive parent and includes, but is not limited to, the right to care, control, and custody 
of the minor child; the right to consent or object to the child's adoption by another person; 
and the duty to support the child.8 
Applying this construction to the facts presently before us, we are unable to 
accord Tina B. status as Z.B.S.'s legal parent. Her relationship with Z.B.S. does not fall 
neatly into any of the categories described above in which the Legislature has specifically 
bestowed parental status. Neither has Tina B. adopted Z.B.S. Most closely analogous to 
8This construction of the definition of "legal parent" is consistent with other 
jurisdictions that have interpreted this term. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Simmons, 355 111. 
App. 3d 942, 292 111. Dec. 47, 825 N.E.2d 303 (2005) (observing that Illinois Parentage 
Act, 750 111. Comp. Stat. Ann. 45/5(a)(l-2), treats husband whose wife has been artificially 
inseminated as natural father of child conceived as a result of such procedure); Hernandez 
v. Robles, 7 Misc. 3d 459, 794 N.Y.S.2d 579 (2005) (automatically according legal parent 
status to person whose spouse conceives a child with donor sperm); In re Marriage of 
Wilson, 199 Or. App. 242, 246 n.l, 110 P.3d 1106, 1108 n.l (2005) (using term "legal 
parent" to refer to "'natural' parents and 'adoptive' parents" as distinguished from "foster 
parents, stepparents, and other nonparents" (citation omitted)); In re H.A.L., No. M2005-
00045-COA-R3-PT, 2005 WL 954866 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2005) (noting that 
statutory definition of "legal parent" contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-l-102(28)(D) 
includes a child's biological and adoptive parents); See also Black's Law Dictionary 1137 
(7th ed. 1999) ("In ordinary usage, the term ['parent'] denotes more than responsibility 
for conception and birth. The term commonly includes (1) either the natural father or the 
natural mother of a child, (2) the adoptive father or adoptive mother of a child, (3) a 
child's putative blood parent who has expressly acknowledged paternity, and (4) an 
individual or agency whose status as guardian has been established by judicial decree."). 
But see Chambers v. Chambers
 9No. CN99-09493, 00-09295,2005 WL 645220 (Del. Fam. 
Ct. Jan. 12, 2005) (determining rights of de facto parent to be on par with those of 
biological or legal parent for purposes of obligation to support child conceived through 
in vitro fertilization); iw re Parentage of A.B., 818N.E.2d 126,131-32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) 
(according legal co-parent status to same-sex partner of woman who had agreed, with 
partner, to conceive child through artificial insemination). 
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the case subjudice is the appointment or nomination of a guardian upon the death of the 
child's parent. Unfortunately, however, there is no record evidence to support a finding 
that Christina S. made such a testamentary appointment of guardianship in favor of Tina 
B. Moreover, the judicial appointment of a guardian for Z.B.S. upon Christina S. 5s death 
was made in favor of Paul S. While the aforementioned examples of "other recognized 
grounds" are by no means the only instances in which legal parent status might be 
accorded, they are indicative of a definite legislative intent to formally recognize someone 
who is not biologically or adoptively related to a child as the child's functional parental 
equivalent. Absent further record evidence or legal authority to support Tina B. 's claims, 
we simply cannot conclude that she meets the definition of a "legal parent" set forth in 
W. Va. Code § 48-1-232. Accordingly, Tina B. is foreclosed from seeking custody of 
Z.B.S. pursuant to W. Va. Code § 48-9-103(a)(l), which accords such standing only to 
"legal parents". 
B. W. Va. Code § 48-9-103 (b) 
Despite her inability to participate in the custodial determinations regarding 
Z.B.S. as the child's legal parent, Tina B. may nevertheless still be granted permission to 
intervene in such custodial proceedings if she satisfies the requirements of W. Va. Code 
§ 48-9-103(b). Paul S. contends that W. Va. Code § 48-9-103(b) is dispositive of the 
instant controversy and that it denies Tina B. standing to seek custody of Z.B.S. We agree 
with Paul S. insofar as we find subsection (b) to be determinative of the resolution of the 
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matter presently before us. We disagree, however, with Paul S.'s construction of W. Va. 
Code § 48-9- 103(b) as denying Tina B. the opportunity to participate in a determination 
ofZ.B.S.'s custody. 
W. Va. Code § 48-9-103(b) (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) directs that 
[i]n exceptional cases the court may, in its discretion, 
grant permission to intervene to other persons or public 
agencies whose participation in the proceedings under this 
article it determines is likely to serve the child's best interests. 
The court may place limitations on participation by the 
intervening party as the court determines to be appropriate. 
Such persons or public agencies do not have standing to 
initiate an action under this article. 
In other words, a person may, subject to the exercise of the court's discretion, intervene 
in a proceeding adjudicating custody if the facts of the particular case warrant such 
intervention and if the intervention is likely to promote the best interests of the subject 
child(ren). See W. Va. Code § 48-9-103(b). 
At this juncture, we feel it is necessary to address the procedural manner in 
which the case sub judice was initiated in the Family Court of Clay County. Paul S. 
complains that, because Tina B. joined in the filing of this lawsuit with Clifford K., she 
is not now entitled to participate in these proceedings as an intervenor. While we 
appreciate the less-than-perfect procedural posture of this case, we do not think this 
imperfect style of pleading disentitles Tina B. to participate in these proceedings. 
24 
Under subsection (b) of W. Va. Code § 48-9-103, if the facts of the case and 
the best interests of Z.B.S. so warrant, Tina B. could be granted permission to intervene 
in a suit seeking his custody, but, pursuant to the plain statutory language, she could not 
initiate such an action herself. See W. Va. Code § 48-9-103(b). Nevertheless, the instant 
proceeding was initiated by both Clifford K. and Tina B. as joint petitioners, rather than 
having been filed by Clifford K. with Tina B. moving to intervene therein. This 
procedural posture is not fatal to our consideration of the matter, however, because the 
family court has cured this defect by apparently treating Tina B. 's petition as a motion for 
intervention and finding that she is a proper party to these proceedings. Arguably, it 
would have been preferable for Clifford K. to have filed the underlying custody 
proceeding and for Tina B. to have moved to intervene in that case pursuant to the plain 
language of W. Va. Code § 48-9-103(b).9 However, u[w]e decline to delay the resolution 
of these pivotal issues on technical procedural grounds, particularly because all necessary 
parties appear to be before the court." Zikos v. Clark, 214 W. Va. 235, 241, 588 S.E.2d 
Alternatively, Tina B. could have initiated an action to formally obtain 
custody of Z.B.S. from Clifford K. because our prior case law entitles a third party to seek 
a change in custody from a child's natural parent. See Syl. pt. 1, Overfieldv. Collins, 199 
W. Va. 27,483 S.E.2d 27 (1996) ("Any attempt by a non-parent to judicially change the 
care and custody of a child from a natural parent must precede that attempt with: (1) the 
filing of a petition setting forth all of the reasons why the change of custody is required; 
and (2) the service of that petition, together with a reasonable notice as to the time and 
place that petition will be heard. Following the filing and service of the petition and 
notice of hearing upon that petition, the natural parents whose rights are being affected 
shall have the right to: (1) present evidence as to the reasons why custody should not be 
changed; and (2) obtain a decision from a neutral, detached person or tribunal."). 
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400, 406 (2003) (per curiam). Furthermore, we previously have stated that "'a mere 
procedural technicality does not take precedence over the best interests of the child[.]'" 
In re Erica C, 214 W. Va. 375, 380, 589 S.E.2d 517, 522 (2003) (per curiam) (quoting//? 
re Tyler Z)., 213 W. Va. 149, 160, 578 S.E.2d 343, 354 (2003) (per curiam)). In short, we 
refuse to elevate form over substance when the family court has found that Tina B. was 
a proper party to the proceedings commenced in that tribunal. See May v. May, 214 
W. Va. 394, 399 n.10, 589 S.E.2d 536, 541 n.10 (2003) ("The distinctions elevate form 
over substance and do not affect the ultimate outcome[.]"); Brooks v. Isinghood, 213 
W. Va. 675, 684, 584 S.E.2d 531, 540 (2003) (observing importance of "insuring] that 
cases and controversies be determined upon their merits and not upon legal technicalities 
or procedural niceties" (internal quotations, citation, and footnote omitted)); Dunlap v. 
Friedman's, Inc., 213 W. Va. 394, 399, 582 S.E.2d 841, 846 (2003) (Davis, J., dissenting) 
(noting that a conclusion which "elevates form over substance . . . defies common 
statutory construction" (internal quotations and citation omitted)). Consequently, we, too, 
will treat Tina B. as if she had intervened in the lower court proceedings pursuant to 
W. Va. Code § 48-9- 103(b) and now consider whether that statutory language entitles her 
to do so. 
Turning back to the statutory requirements for one to be accorded permission 
to intervene in a custody determination proceeding, then, it is apparent that if Tina B. can 
demonstrate that the facts surrounding Z.B.S.'s custodial determination are such as to be 
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"exceptional," she would, subject to the court's discretion and the best interests of Z.B.S., 
be entitled to intervene in such proceedings. See W. Va. Code § 48-9-103(b). As with our 
prior analysis of the meaning of "other recognized grounds," however, the Legislature has 
left undefined "exceptional cases". 
In custodial proceedings, the Legislature has reserved the right to participate 
therein to a child's parents and custodians and to certain other persons who are permitted 
to intervene in specific cases. See W. Va. Code §§ 48-9-103(a-b). Identifying those other 
persons and/or entities who may intervene, the Legislature has specified that their 
intervention is appropriate in "exceptional cases". See W. Va. Code § 48-9-103(b). 
Absent a statutory definition of "exceptional cases," we must necessarily defer to the 
"common, ordinary and accepted meaning [of the terms] in the connection in which they 
are used." Syl. pt. 1, in part, Miners in Gen. Group v. Hix, 123 W. Va. 637,17 S.E.2d 810. 
The word "exceptional" is defined as "[t]he rare - the unusual or extraordinary case or 
circumstance." Ballentine's Law Dictionary 426 (3d ed. 1969) (citation omitted). Accord 
Chambers 20th Century Dictionary 438 (1983) (interpreting "exceptional" as "unusual"); 
Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary 674 (2d ed. 1998) (stating that 
"exceptional" is "forming an exception or rare instance; unusual; extraordinary"); 
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 432 (9th ed. 1983) (defining "exceptional" 
as "forming an exception: rare"). Stated otherwise, "exceptional" has been construed to 
mean "[o]f the nature of or forming an exception; out of the ordinary course, unusual, 
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special." Ill The Oxford English Dictionary 374 (1969 re-issue). Accord Webster's Third 
New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 791 (1970) 
(understanding "exceptional" as "forming an exception; usu: being out of the ordinary: 
uncommon, rare"). From these definitions of "exceptional," it is apparent that the 
Legislature intended to permit intervention in custodial proceedings only in unusual or 
extraordinary cases. Therefore, we hold that the reference to "exceptional cases" 
contained in W. Va. Code § 48-9-103(b) (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) signifies unusual or 
extraordinary cases, and, accordingly, a court should exercise its discretion to permit 
intervention in such unusual or extraordinary cases only when intervention is likely to 
serve the best interests of the subject child(ren).10 We believe that the factual predicate 
of the case subjudice presents the unusual and extraordinary circumstances contemplated 
by the legislative intent of W. Va. Code § 48-9-103(b). 
In this case, we are faced with the unique situation of a child who, since his 
birth, has lived in a nontraditional household and who has more than the customary 
number of parental figures in his young life. On the one hand are the biological parents 
At least one other court has similarly construed an "exceptional case" 
requirement in the context of child custody matters to warrant a case-by-case factual 
determination based upon the best interests of the child(ren) involved. See In re Marriage 
of Williams, 32 Kan. App. 2d 842, , 90 P.3d 365, 370 (2004) ("Perhaps it is best that 
neither statutory law nor case precedent provides a definition for 'exceptional case.' The 
determination is too important to be subjected to a mechanical application of an artificial 
litmus test containing three factors or two prongs."). 
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of Z.B.S., Christina S., his now-deceased biological mother, and Clifford K.5 his biological 
father, who initiated the underlying custody action but who does not wish to assume 
custody of Z.B.S. On the other hand is Tina B., who has resided continuously with Z.B.S. 
since his birth and who has cared for and treated him as if he were her own biological 
child. As a result of the deep attachment and emotional bonds that have mutually arisen 
between Tina B. and Z.B.S., Tina B. characterizes herself as the child's psychological 
parent. Although we previously have recognized the concept of a psychological parent 
in our jurisprudence, we have never formally defined it. In order to ascertain whether Tina 
B. is Z.B.S.'s psychological parent and what effect, if any, such status would have upon 
her ability to intervene in these custodial proceedings, it is necessary first to gain a better 
understanding of the nature and scope of psychological parent status. 
We first recognized the notion of a psychological parent in the case of State 
ex rel McCartney v. Nuzwn, 161 W. Va. 740, 248 S.E.2d 318 (1978), overruled on other 
grounds by In re Katie S.9 198 W. Va. 79, 479 S.E.2d 589 (1996). In that case, we 
recognized that "in certain instances psychological testimony would . . . be relevant in 
aiding the determination of who should have custody of a child." 161 W. Va. at 744 n.3, 
248 S.E.2d at 320 n.3 (citation omitted). However we declined to award custody to the 
psychological parent in that case because we previously had determined the child's natural 
mother to be entitled to her custody. See McCartney v. Coberly, 250 S.E.2d 777 (W. Va. 
1978), overruled on other grounds by Overfieldv. Collins, 199 W. Va. 27, 483 S.E.2d 27 
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(1996). 
Our next consideration of psychological parent status was in Honaker v. 
Burnside, 182 W. Va. 448, 388 S.E.2d 322 (1989). Honaker involved a custodial contest 
between a child's natural father and her stepfather, with whom she had resided since she 
was just over one year old. In recognizing that a gradual transition of custody from the 
stepfather to the natural father was warranted, we observed with respect to the child's 
longtime residence with her stepfather and half-brother that "[t]hese familial surroundings 
are the only ones she has ever known, and it is undisputed that she has developed a close 
and loving relationship with her stepfather." 182 W. Va. at 450, 388 S.E.2d at 323. Thus, 
by recognizing the significant role her stepfather had played in the child's life as her 
psychological parent, we accorded visitation privileges to him, as well as to the child's 
half-brother, despite the ultimate award of the child's custody to her biological father. 
The following year we again revisited the concept of a psychological parent 
in the case of In re Brandon I.E., 183 W. Va. 113, 394 S.E.2d 515 (1990). In Brandon, 
we were called upon to ascertain which court possessed jurisdiction to decide the fate of 
a child embroiled in a bitter custody dispute between his biological father, with whom he 
had had infrequent contact, and his maternal grandmother, who had participated in his 
upbringing since his birth and who was, at the time of the proceedings, serving as his 
primary caretaker. During the course of our deliberations, we acknowledged that 
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psychological parent status is entitled to consideration in appropriate cases: 
If a child has resided with an individual other than a 
parent for a significant period of time such that the non-parent 
with whom the child resides serves as the child's 
psychological parent, during a period when the natural parent 
had the right to maintain continuing substantial contact with 
the child and failed to do so, the equitable rights of the child 
must be considered in connection with any decision that would 
alter the child's custody. To protect the equitable rights of a 
child in this situation, the child's environment should not be 
disturbed without a clear showing of significant benefit to 
him, notwithstanding the parent's assertion of a legal right to 
the child. 
Syl. pt. 4, In re Brandon, 183 W. Va. 113, 394 S.E.2d 515. 
Thereafter, in Ortner v. Pritt, 187 W. Va. 494, 419 S.E.2d 907 (1992) (per 
curiam), we considered who, as between the child's biological mother, with whom the 
child had resided only sporadically, and the child's paternal grandmother, with whom the 
child had lived for over half of his young life, was entitled to custody. We found the 
grandmother had become the child's psychological parent and awarded custody to her, 
instead of to the child's biological mother, because such a custodial placement was found 
to be in the child's best interests. We did not, however, expound upon the law of 
psychological parent status or further clarify that term. 
In 1993, we decided Simmons v. Comer, 190 W. Va. 350, 438 S.E.2d 530 
(1993). Simmons involved a concept that is remarkably similar to that of psychological 
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parent status: the functioning father. Under the facts of that case, we determined that 
where a putative father has developed a strong relationship with a child and served as the 
child's functioning father, he may later have standing to seek custody of the child as 
against the child's a biological mother. 
Where a biological mother is married to the putative 
father or, although not married, advises him that he is the 
biological father and he marries her, he may have standing 
through the doctrine of equitable estoppel to assert a right to 
custody of the child. In order to maintain his claim of 
custody, the putative father must demonstrate that he has 
developed a caring relationship to the child such that he has 
become a functioning father. He will also have the benefit of 
the primary caretaker presumption if the facts so warrant. 
Syl. pt. 5, Simmons v. Comer, 190 W. Va. 350, 438 S.E.2d 530. In order to attain such 
status, the putative father must demonstrate that he has a significant parental relationship 
with the child. 
A nonbiological father must show a caring father-child 
relationship, which means not only providing for the financial 
support of the child, but also emotional and psychological 
support. The relationship must have begun with the consent 
of the biological mother. It must not have been temporary and 
there must have been sufficient time for the nonbiological 
father to become the functioning father. 
Syl. pt. 6, Simmons, 190 W. Va. 350, 438 S.E.2d 530. Defining the concept of 
"functioning father," we recognized that the duration of the relationship between the child 
and the functioning father "assists a court's determination as to the extent of the child's 
bond with the functioning father." Id., 190 W. Va. at 359, 438 S.E.2d at 539 (citations 
omitted). An additional consideration is "'the need for consent to ensure that the existing 
32 
legal parent has cooperated with or encouraged a man to assume a parenting role[.]'" Id., 
190 W. Va. at 359 n.14, 438 S.E.2d at 539 n.14 (quoting J.H. Anderson, The Functioning 
Father: A Unified Approach to Paternity Determinations, 30 J. Fam. L. 847, 865-67 
(1992)). 
We also stated in Simmons that "[w]e believe the principle of a functioning 
father is consistent with our previous cases and, particularly, In Interest of Brandon L.E., 
183 W. Va. 113,394 S.E.2d 515 (1990), where we used the term 'psychological parent.'" 
190 W. Va. at 360,438 S.E.2d at 540 (footnote omitted). Recognizing this similarity, we 
further acknowledged that 
"[a] psychological parent is one who, on a continuing, 
day-to-day basis, through interaction, companionship, 
interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological 
needs for a parent, as well as the child's physical needs. The 
psychological parent may be a biological,... adoptive, foster, 
or common-law . . . parent, or any other person. There is no 
presumption in favor of any of these after the initial 
assignment at birth[.]" 
190 W. Va. at 360 n. 15, 438 S.E.2d at 540 n. 15 (quoting Joseph Goldstein et al, Beyond 
the Best Interests of the Chi!d98 (1979)). Accord Overfield v. Collins, 199 W. Va. 27, 37 
n.8, 483 S.E.2d 27, 37 n.8 (1996).11 
1
 Although we acknowledged the existence of the psychological parent 
concept in Overfield v. Collins, 199 W. Va. 27, 483 S.E.2d 27 (1996), further discussion 
of the facts and law of that case is not instructive to our present analysis. In summary, 
Overfield involved the transfer of custody from a biological mother to the children's 
(continued...) 
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Most recently, mln re Jonathan G., 198 W. Va. 716,482 S.E.2d 893 (1996), 
we considered the role that foster parents may play in abuse and neglect proceedings in 
view of the significant relationship they have developed with the child for whom they 
have cared. We concluded that, as a result of the bonds that have formed, foster parents 
are, subject to the court's discretion, entitled to participate in such proceedings. In this 
regard, we held that "[t]h© level and type of participation [by the foster parents] in such 
cases is left to the sound discretion of the circuit court with due consideration of the length 
of time the child has been cared for by the foster parents and the relationship that has 
developed[.]" Syl. pt. 1, in part, id. We ultimately concluded that, as a result of the strong 
emotional attachment the child had to the foster parents, who had served as his custodians 
from the time he was ten months old until he was over four years old, they were entitled 
to visitation with the child, provided such visitation was in the boy's best interests. 
From our prior decisions, we can glean several common threads as to the 
meaning of psychological parent status, both from our specific recognition of this term and 
from our cases involving persons who have not been specifically denominated as 
psychological parents but who nevertheless have established such a meaningful 
11
 (...continued) 
maternal grandparents, and our law of the case sought to clarify the procedures to be 
followed when such a custodial transfer occurs. Insofar as Christina S. did not transfer 
custody of Z.B.S. to any party before her death, the holdings of Overfield are inapplicable 
to the case subjudice. See generally Syl. pts. 1-6, Overfield, 199 W. Va. 27, 483 S.E.2d 
27. 
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relationship with a minor child so as to be entitled to greater protection under the law than 
would ordinarily be afforded to one who is not the biological or adoptive parent of the 
child. Stitching together these common threads, we find that the most crucial components 
of the psychological parent concept are the formation of a significant relationship between 
a child and an adult,12 who may be, but is not required to be, related to the child 
biologically or adoptively;13 a substantial temporal duration of the relationship;14 the 
adult's assumption of caretaking duties for and provision of emotional and financial 
support to the child;15 and, most importantly, the fostering and encouragement of, and 
12See, e.g., Syl. pt. 1, in part, In re Jonathan G., 198 W. Va. 716,482 S.E.2d 
893 (1996); Overfieldv. Collins, 199 W. Va. 27,37 n.8,483 S.E.2d 27,37 n.8 (1996); Syl. 
pts. 5-6, in part, Simmons v. Comer, 190 W. Va. 350, 438 S.E.2d 530 (1993); Ortner v. 
Pritt, 187 W. Va. 494, 419 S.E.2d 907 (1992) (per curiam); In re Brandon L.E., 183 
W. Va. 113, 394 S.E.2d 515 (1990); Honaker v. Burnside, 182 W. Va. 448, 450, 388 
S.E.2d 322, 323(1989). 
uSee, e.g., Syl. pt. 1, in part, In re Jonathan, 198 W. Va. 716, 482 S.E.2d 
893; Overfieldv. Collins, 199 W. Va. at 37 n.8,483 S.E.2d at 37 n.8; Syl. pts. 5-6, in part, 
Simmons v. Comer, 190 W. Va. 350,438 S.E.2d 530; Ortner v. Pritt, 187 W. Va. 494,419 
S.E.2d 907; In re Brandon, 183 W. Va. 113, 394 S.E.2d 515; Honaker v. Burnside, 182 
W. Va. at 450, 388 S.E.2d at 323. 
]4See, e.g., Syl. pt. 1, in part, In re Jonathan, 198 W. Va. 716, 482 S.E.2d 
893; Overfield v. Collins, 199 W. Va. at 37 n.8, 483 S.E.2d at 37 n.8; Syl. pt. 6, in part, 
Simmons v. Comer, 190 W. Va. 350,438 S.E.2d 530; Ortner v. Pritt, 187 W. Va. 494,419 
S.E.2d 907; Syl. pt. 4, in part, In re Brandon, 183 W. Va. 113, 394 S.E.2d 515; Honaker 
v. Burnside, 182 W. Va. at 450, 388 S.E.2d at 323. 
lsSee, e.g., Overfieldv. Collins, 199 W. Va. at 37 n.8, 483 S.E.2d at 37 n.8; 
Syl. pts. 5-6, Simmons v. Comer, 190 W. Va. 350, 438 S.E.2d 530; Ortner v. Pritt, 187 
W. Va. 494, 419 S.E.2d 907; In re Brandon, 183 W. Va. 113, 394 S.E.2d 515. 
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consent to, such relationship by the child's legal parent or guardian.16 Moreover, our prior 
decisions suggest that one may attain psychological parent status either while living in the 
same household as the child and his/her legal parent or guardian17 or while residing with 
the child in the absence of the child's legal parent or guardian.18 Accordingly, we hold 
that a psychological parent is a person who, on a continuing day-to-day basis, through 
interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills a child's psychological and 
physical needs for a parent and provides for the child's emotional and financial support. 
The psychological parent may be a biological, adoptive, or foster parent, or any other 
person. The resulting relationship between the psychological parent and the child must 
be of substantial, not temporary, duration and must have begun with the consent and 
encouragement of the child's legal parent or guardian. To the extent that this holding is 
inconsistent with our prior decision of In re BrandonL.E., 183 W. Va. 113,394 S.E.2d515 
(1990), that case is expressly modified.19 
uSee, e.g., Syl. pts. 5-6, in part, Simmons v. Comer, 190 W. Va. 350, 438 
S.E.2d530. 
11
 See, e.g., Syl. pt. 5, in part, Simmons v. Comer, 190 W. Va. 350,438 S.E.2d 
530; Honaker v. Burnside, 182 W. Va. at 450, 388 S.E.2d at 323. 
nSee, e.g., Syl. pt. 1, in part, In re Jonathan, 198 W. Va. 716, 482 S.E.2d 
893; Ortnerv.Pritt, 187 W. Va. 494, 419 S.E.2d 907; In re Brandon, 183 W. Va. 113,394 
S.E.2d515. 
19This holding is in line with other courts that have defined "psychological 
parent" or discussed the similar concepts of "de facto parent" status or "in loco parentis". 
See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 319 N.J. Super. 103, 725 A.2d 13 (1999), aff'd, 163 N J . 200, 748 
A.2d 539 (2000); LB. v. L.R.M., 2000 Pa. Super. 168, 753 A.2d 873, appeal granted, 568 
(continued...) 
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With the announcement of this holding we also wish to make it abundantly 
clear that the mere existence of a psychological parent relationship, in and of itself, does 
not automatically permit the psychological parent to intervene in a proceeding to 
determine a child's custody pursuant to W. Va. Code § 48-9- 103(b). Nothing is more 
sacred or scrupulously safeguarded as a parent's right to the custody of his/her child. 
In the law concerning custody of minor children, no 
rule is more firmly established than that the right of a natural 
parent to the custody of his or her infant child is paramount to 
that of any other person; it is a fundamental personal liberty 
protected and guaranteed by the Due Process Clauses of the 
West Virginia and United States Constitutions. 
Syl. pt. 1, In re Willis, 157 W. Va. 225, 207 S.E.2d 129 (1973). Accord Syl., Whiteman v. 
Robinson, 145 W. Va. 685, 116 S.E.2d 691 (1960) ("A parent has the natural right to the 
custody of his or her infant child, unless the parent is an unfit person because of 
misconduct, neglect, immorality, abandonment or other dereliction of duty, or has waived 
such right, or by agreement or otherwise has transferred, relinquished or surrendered such 
custody, the right of the parent to the custody of his or her infant child will be recognized 
and enforced by the courts."). See also Honaker, 182 W. Va. at 452, 388 S.E.2d at 325 
(stating that "[ajlthough we recognize the attachment and secure relationship" between the 
child and her psychological parent stepfather, "such bond cannot alter the otherwise secure 
19(... continued) 
Pa. 667, 795 A.2d 979 (2000) (unpublished table decision), affd, 567 Pa. 222, 786 A.2d 
913 (2001); In re Parentage of LB., 121 Wash. App. 460, 89 P.3d 271, review granted, 152 
Wash. 2d 1013, 101 P.3d 107 (2004) (unpublished table decision). ButseeB.F. v. T.D., 
No. 2004-CA-000083-ME, 2005 WL 857093 (Ky. Ct App. Apr. 15, 2005). 
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natural rights of a parent," namely the child's biological father). But see Syl. pt. 6, in part, 
Lemleyv,Barr, 176 W. Va. 378, 343 S.E.2dl01 (1986) ('The law does not recognize any 
absolute right in any person or claimant to the custody of a child."); Syl. pt. 3, in part, 
State ex rel Lipscomb v. Joplin, 131 W. Va. 302, 47 S.E.2d 221 (1948) ("[T]he court is in 
no case bound to deliver the child into the custody of any claimant and may permit it to 
remain in such custody as its welfare at the time appears to require."). For this reason, the 
limited rights of a psychological parent cannot ordinarily trump those of a biological or 
adoptive parent to the care, control, and custody of his/her child. Nonetheless, as we have 
alluded to throughout the course of this opinion, the case we presently have before us does 
not comport with the usual facts attending a custodial determination under W. Va. Code 
§ 48-9-101, et seq. Consequently, we hold that, in exceptional cases and subject to the 
court's discretion, a psychological parent may intervene in a custody proceeding brought 
pursuant to W. Va. Code § 48-9-103 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) when such intervention is 
likely to serve the best interests of the child(ren) whose custody is under adjudication.20 
Applying these principles to the case sub judice, we first must determine 
whether Tina B. is Z.B.S.'s psychological parent. Without a doubt, she is. From the 
moment of his birth, Tina B. resided in Christina S. 's household with Z.B.S. and parented 
20This decision accords with our sister jurisdictions who have permitted a 
psychological parent to participate in custody proceedings. See, e.g., T.B. v. L.R.M., 2000 
Pa. Super. 168, 753 A.2d 873; In re Parentage ofL.B., 121 Wash. App. 460, 89 P.3d 271. 
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him as if he were her own biological child. Although Christina S. was the child's primary 
caretaker, Tina B. nevertheless also attended to his needs and provided financial as well 
as emotional support for the child. In fact, the circuit court, adopting the findings of the 
family court, specifically so found: 
The evidence shows that Tina B[.] and Christina S[.] 
planned the birth of Z.B.S. and enlisted the involvement of 
Clifford K[.] only for the purpose of impregnating Christina 
S[.] It was their apparent intention together to raise Z.B.S 
as a "family" unit . . . . [A] strong parent-child bond exists 
between Z.B.S. and Tina B[J 
Apparently no relationship existed between Clifford 
K[.] and Christina S[.] before conception of Z.B.S. Although 
he has had contact with Z.B.S. since the child's birth, he has 
performed limited care-giving functions and his planned as 
well as actual involvement with the child has been limited. 
Clifford K[.] would not have soughtprimary custody of Z.B.S. 
but for the death of Christina D. S[.] in June 2002. The bond 
between Clifford Kf.J and Z.B.S. is not as strong as the bond 
between Z.B.S. and Tina Bf.J 
Prior to the death of Christina S[.] on June 1, 2002, 
Christina S[.] was the primary custodian and caretaker of 
Z.B.S. and of the parties to this matter, Tina B [J provided the 
most caretaking services to Z.B.S. prior to June 1, 2002. 
(Emphasis added). The circuit court also noted that "the child resided with the biological 
mother and [Tina] B[.] from birth until the biological mother's untimely death, when the 
child was approximately two and a half years old." 
These findings are further supported by the recommendations of the child's 
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guardian ad litem, who similarly observed that 
as an intended consequence of their intimate relationship, Tina 
and Chris [Christina S.] enlisted the assistance of the 
Petitioner Clifford K[.] (hereafter "Cliff") to impregnate Chris, 
so that Tina and Chris could have a child "together." . . . 
In April, 1999, Chris's pregnancy was confirmed. . . . 
From April, 1991 until December, 1999, Tina 
accompanied Chris to almost all prenatal medical 
appointments. Z[.B.S.] was born on December 25, 1999. . . . 
Tina, Chris, and Z[.B.S.] . . . continued to reside together in 
Clay County as a family unit. 
. . . Tina kept Z[.B.S.] the vast majority of the time 
after his first year of life while Chris was at work. . . . 
. . . [A] significant bond and affection exists between 
Tina and Z[.B.S.] . . . 
But for Chris' tragic death in June of 2002, . . . Chris 
and Tina would have continued to raise Z[.B.S.] as they had 
from his birth on December 25, 1999 until June 1, 2002. . . . 
. . . [Tina B.] has been Z.[B.S.]'s psychological parent 
since the date of his birth on December 25, 1999. She, along 
with Chris (until her death), has lived with Z[.B.S.] since his 
birth and she has performed all of the traditional caretaking 
functions of a parent as well as having financially supported 
him during his life. And the fact that she served as Z[.B.S.] 's 
parent was not by accident. Rather, it was by design, and by 
the agreement of Chris, Cliff, and Tina. 
. . . Z[.B.S.] has clearly resided with Tina for a 
significant period of time such that Tina (by design and in 
practice) served as Z[.B.S.]'s psychological parent . . . . 
. . . Tina was and is Z.[B.S.]'s second mother, by 
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design and in actuality. . . . 
Thus, there unquestionably exists a relationship of significant duration between Tina B. 
and Z.B.S. in which Tina B. has provided for the physical, psychological, financial, and 
emotional needs of Z.B.S. and such that the child regards Tina B. as a parental figure in 
his life. 
Moreover, Christina S. not only consented to the formation of this strong 
relationship between Tina B. and Z.B.S.; Christina S. actively fostered and nurtured this 
bond. In the same manner, Clifford K. also acquiesced in the development of secure ties 
between Z.B.S. and Tina B., and, like Christina S., purposefully encouraged such a 
familial relationship. Having satisfied the above-enumerated criteria, we are convinced 
that Tina B. is the psychological parent of Z.B.S. 
Having established Tina B.'s relationship to the subject child, we next must 
determine whether her status as a psychological parent entitles her to intervene in 
proceedings seeking a determination of his custody. Under the unique facts and 
circumstances of this case, we agree with the family court's conclusion that Tina B. is a 
proper party to these proceedings and disagree with the contrary decision reached by the 
circuit court. Although we caution that not every psychological parent is, by virtue of 
such status, entitled to intervene in custodial proceedings pursuant to W. Va. Code § 48-9-
103(b), the very unusual and extraordinary facts of this case warrant extending that 
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privilege to Tina B. Not only do the facts support such a finding herein, but the best 
interests of the subject child demand such a result. The best interests of Z.B.S. also 
militate in favor of an award of custody to Tina B., consistent with the result obtained by 
the Family Court of Clay County. 
At the forefront of our decision is the counsel of the Legislature that the aim 
of the governing statute is to secure the best interests of the children whose custody is to 
be determined and to promote stability and certainty in their young lives. "The primary 
objective of this article is to serve the child's best interests, by facilitating . . . [stability 
of the child. . . [and]. . . [cjontinuity of existing parent-child attachments [.]" W. Va. Code 
§§ 48-9-102(a)(l,3). This appreciation for stability in a child's life has also been a 
frequent refrain of this Court. "[Stability in a child's life is a major concern when 
formulating custody arrangements." Snyder v. Scheerer, 190 W. Va. 64,72-73,436 S.E.2d 
299,307-08 (1993) (per curiam) (citation omitted). Therefore, "in cases where a child has 
been in one home for a substantial period, '[h]is environment and sense of security should 
not be disturbed without a clear showing of significant benefit to him.'" In re Brandon, 
183 W. Va. at 121, 394 S.E.2d at 523 (quoting Lemley v. Barr, 176 W. Va. 378, 386, 343 
S.E.2d 101, 110 (1986) (internal quotations and citations omitted)). We would be remiss 
if we did not also reiterate that "[a] child has rights, too, some of which are of a 
constitutional magnitude." Lemley, 176 W. Va. at 386, 343 S.E.2d at 109 (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). Among these, "[a] child has a right to continued 
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association with individuals with whom he has formed a close emotional bond . . . 
provided that a determination is made that such continued contact is in the best interests 
of the child." Syl.pt. 11, inpart, In re Jonathan, 198 W. Va. 716,482 S.E.2d 893. Accord 
Snyder v. Scheerer, 190 W. Va. at 72,436 S.E.2d at 307 (recognizing "the right of a child 
to continued association with those individuals to whom the child has formed an 
attachment"). In this regard, "[t]he length of time that the child has remained with [such 
individual(s)] is a significant factor to consider in determining this issue." In re Jonathan, 
198 W. Va. at 736 n.41, 482 S.E.2d at 913 n.41. 
The tragic events that have led to the circumstances in which Z.B.S. 
currently finds himself have resulted in litigation over his permanent custodial placement 
only because too many people love this little boy. Oh that all of the children whose fates 
we must decide would be so fortunate as to be too loved. That said, it is now up to this 
Court to ascertain whether the family court correctly determined that Z.B.S.'s best 
interests would be served by awarding his custody to Tina B. First and foremost, we have 
determined that Tina B. is Z.B.S.'s psychological parent, with all the bonds, attachments, 
caretaking functions, and responsibilities that such status entails. In reaching this decision, 
we have found that both of the child's biological parents not only acquiesced in, but 
actively fostered, the relationship that has developed between Tina B. and Z.B.S. 
We also are persuaded by the current situation into which the child has been 
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thrust upon the tragic death of his mother: the other parental figure with whom he has 
continuously resided, Tina B., is eager to legally assume his custody and to continue 
attending to his daily needs, and his biological father, his sole surviving legal parent, 
readily agrees and enthusiastically consents to such an arrangement. To reunite Tina B. 
and Z.B.S. through a formal custodial arrangement would be to secure the familial 
environment to which the child has become accustomed and to accord parental status to 
the adult he already views in this capacity. Simply stated, an award of custody to Tina B., 
having found no indication that she is unfit21 to serve as the minor's custodian, would 
promote Z.B.S.'s best interests by allowing continuity of care by the person whom he 
currently regards as his parent and would thus provide stability and certainty in his life.22 
See Syl. pt. 11, In re Jonathan, 198 W. Va. 716, 482 S.E.2d 893; In re Brandon, 183 
W. Va. at 121, 394 S.E.2d at 523; Lemley v. Barr, 176 W. Va. at 386, 343 S.E.2d at 110.23 
In fact, the guardian ad litem specifically addressed this point and stated 
that "no party [has] raised any parental fitness issue regarding Tina's shared upbringing 
ofZ[.B.S.]" 
22We emphasize, though, that if Clifford K. had substantially participated in 
Z.B.S.'s upbringing, expressed an interest in obtaining custody of his biological son, and 
actively participated in the instant proceedings, barring a finding that Clifford K. is unfit, 
a different result might have been reached as to the custodial placement most befitting the 
best interests of Z.B.S. 
23For decisions of other courts who have considered cases involving facts 
similar to those presented by the case subjudice see generally Robin Cheryl Miller, Child 
Custody and Visitation Rights Arising from Same-Sex Relationship, 80 A.L.R.5th 1 (2000). 
See also Nancy G. Maxwell & Caroline J. Forder, The Inadequacies in U.S. and Dutch 
Adoption Law to Establish Same-Sex Couples as Legal Parents: A Call for Recognizing 
Intentional Parenthood, 38 Fam. L.Q. 623 (2004). 
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While we applaud the efforts of the maternal grandparents of Z.B.S. to 
secure his guardianship upon his mother's death to ensure that his care, custody, and 
control would not be left to chance, their rights to and relationship with Z.B.S., while 
significant and substantial, simply are not on par with those of Tina B. under the facts and 
circumstances of this case. Cf. Rozas v. Rozas, 176 W. Va. 235,238, 342 S.E.2d 201, 205 
(1986) ("Absent a showing that a natural parent is unfit, a natural parent's right to custody 
outstrips that of a grandparent." (citations omitted)); Leach v. Bright, 165 W. Va. 636,63 8, 
270 S.E.2d 793, 794 (1980) (per curiam) ("The law in this jurisdiction has long been that 
the fit natural parent's right to custody of his or her child is paramount to that of any third 
party, including a grandparent." (citation omitted)). See also Syl. pt. 3, State ex rel David 
Allen B. v. Sommerville, 194 W. Va. 86,459 S.E.2d 363 (1995) (holding that, with regard 
to establishment of paternity, rights of grandparent are more limited than those of alleged 
biological parent); Frame v. Wehn, 120 W. Va. 208, 212, 197 S.E. 524, 526 (1938) 
(finding that rights of grandparents were not coextensive with those of parents in 
guardianship proceedings). 
For these reasons, then, we find that Tina B. was entitled to participate in 
Z.B.S. 's custodial proceedings. Accordingly, we reverse the December 2, 2003, ruling of 
the Clay County Circuit Court which denied Tina B. permission to participate in Z.B.S.'s 
custodial determination. Furthermore, remanding this case for additional proceedings to 
determine Z.B.S.'s permanent custody would be futile. The family court has consistently 
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held that the best interests of Z.B.S. dictate that his custody be awarded to Tina B.5 which 
finding is consistent with the guardian ad litem's recommendations and the psychological 
evidence presented below. Moreover, the circuit court has adopted these findings of fact 
in rendering its decision in this matter which differs from the conclusions of the family 
court solely on the basis of the application of the law to the facts of this case. From our 
consideration of this matter, we agree with the family court's assessment of the evidence 
and the circuit court's adoption of those findings. Simply stated, the child's best interests 
would best be served by awarding permanent custody of Z.B.S. to Tina B. Thus, we 
reinstate the July 25, 2003, decision of the Clay County Family Court awarding custody 
of the minor child Z.B.S. to Tina B.24 
In closing, we wish to restate a cautionary admonition we first intimated in 
Honaker v. Burnside, 182 W. Va. 448, 388 S.E.2d 322 (1989), and later reiterated in 
Overfieldv. Collins, 199 W. Va. 27, 483 S.E.2d 27 (1996): 
"The work that lies ahead for both [adults] is not without 
inconvenience and sacrifice on both sides. Their energies 
should not be directed even partially at any continued rancor 
at one another, but must be fully directed at developing 
compassion and understanding for one another, as well as 
showing love and sensitivity to the child[']s feelings at a 
difficult time in all their lives." 
Overfield, 199 W. Va. at 38, 483 S.E.2d at 38 (quoting Honaker, 182 W. Va. at 453, 388 
24Having resolved the case in this fashion, we need not address Tina B.'s 
remaining assignments of error. 
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S.E.2d at 326-27). This same wise counsel applies with equal force to the parties in this 
case, Tina B. and Paul S. We only hope that they and their respective families can let 
bygones be bygones and now interact amicably for the sake of Z.B.S. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the December 2, 2003, decision of the Circuit 
Court of Clay County is hereby reversed. 
Reversed. 
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